Abstract: This paper suggests that time travelling scenarios commonly depicted in science fiction introduce problems and dangers for the time traveller. If time travel takes time, then time travellers risk collision with past objects, relocation to distant parts of the universe, and time travel-specific injuries. I propose several models of time travel that avoid the dangers and risks of time travel taking time, and that introduce new questions about the relationship between time travel and spatial location. 
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Nowhere Man: Time Travel and Spatial Location 
Preliminaries
Let us suppose that time travel occurs when an object or person is relocated in time through means other than continuing to exist. We are all moving forward in time by
existing, but that is not time travel in the metaphysically interesting sense of the term. 1 Notable exceptions are Dowe (2000) , Nahin (1999) , Grey (1999) .
In order to focus on time travel that takes time, the following discussion will largely ignore instantaneous time travel. The instantaneous notion is not problematic per se, but it does turn time travel into the result of a particularly fancy invention. Instantaneous time travel belongs squarely in the realm of science fiction due to its reliance on easily stipulated magical or mysterious devices. I will largely set aside such cases.
I will also set aside a plethora of more commonly discussed metaphysical issues surrounding time travel: the possibility of killing one's own grandfather, the coherence of backwards causation, the relativity of simultaneity, time travel within specific theories of 2 Even instantaneous time travel isn't metaphysically simple. The split second that it takes a time traveller to disappear and reappear has a minute temporal spread. In order to be truly instantaneous, time travel would have to adjust for the split second it takes to disappear and reappear-a kind of temporal correction of the time traveller's journey.
time, and so on. These are important issues, but not easily tackled in one discussion. Now onto our focus: non-instantaneous time travel. The Very Slow Time Machine's titular mechanism takes years to transport its passenger a short distance to the past. Lewis (1976) The smiley indicates Bianca's spatiotemporal location. If Bianca's house is filled with concrete from 1980-1990, then she will collide with the concrete on her way into the past.
Bianca must be causally isolated from any influences that would interrupt her time travel or disturb her time machine.
Grey (1999), Dowe (2000) , and Lepoidevin (2005) Dowe (2000) suggests that the problem of double occupancy can be avoided by ensuring that the time machine gradually moves in space on its backwards journey so as to avoid itself in the past. But a past-travelling temponaut is always at risk of colliding with any objects or people that inhabited the space up to the presence of the time machine.
In order to ensure the safety of the time traveller, an empty space must have been Sider (2005) argues that Lewis' model of time travel only works if personal time is substantive. Demarest (2015) articulates two ways of conceiving of personal time-location on a spacetime worm, a clock attached to temporal stages of a time traveller-and argues that both fail to account for important spatially outstrip space on the external timeline: an entire year-long journey must be spatially "stored" within one day. A time traveller risks running short on the spatiotemporal region needed for her journey. She must be located at s1 for an entire year, a temporal duration much greater than the the one day period on the external timeline.
On Lewis' deflationary picture, personal time is not "extra" metaphysically substantive time added to the universe. It is not, so to speak, a kind of time itself; it is distinguished only by being differently experienced by the time traveler. The deflationist insists that the time machine only seems to be moving very rapidly relative to the external timeline, but is not moving rapidly simpliciter. Bianca's journey is only an extreme an independent timeline against which the time traveller's journey can be measured.
Imagine that Bianca's time machine is located in s1 for one year in order to travel one hour into the past. The year must, in a sense, be "contained" in the space of the time machine, and proceeds at a very rapid pace relative to its surroundings. The spacetime region within the machine is denser than that outside of it, for there is an entire year proceeding in the time machine in the space of one hour in external time. Bianca's reality unfolding very rapidly, at a rate of 365 days to one day-the rate of passage of external time to personal time. Note that, from a God's-eye view, this scenario looks no different than the deflationist's conception of personal time, according to which observers also see a backwards-seeming, rapidly-evolving stream of events in Bianca's machine. The difference is that Bianca's reality is distinct, in an important sense, from her environs, whereas on the deflationist picture, the difference is illusory.
Models that Avoid Problems with TTTT
Aside from a meticulously planned journey that includes space set aside in the past, there are several metaphysical models of time travel that avoid the problems of selfcollision and spatial collision. Here I describe two such models, the first of which shares some similarity with the immediately preceding discussion.
Solution #1: Personal Space and External Space
The first model involves a distinction between personal space and external space similar to Lewis' distinction between personal time and external time. It is not directly analogous in that Lewis' distinction doesn't posit "extra" time in addition to external time-no new temporal points are added to the universe when a time traveller initiates a journey. A personal space/ external space distinction, on the other hand, requires an extra dimension of space for the time traveller, like the picture according to which personal time is a substantive addition to reality.
Here's how it works. Rather than spatial co-location with past objects and people in external space, we might instead stipulate that the time traveller occupies "personal space" distinct from the "external" space in the spatiotemporal manifold. With this distinction in hand, time travel would involve a discrepancy between personal space and external space.
Suppose that Bianca is spatially located at spot s1 in Phoenix, where she initiates 
